The folks at the ACS blog are in a debate with some opponents from the Federalist Society. Since the person who responded to my last note invited me to comment again in the future, I sent in a paragraph:

"I'm surprised that lawyers, who spend their professional lives as actors in an adversarial system, one in which the integrity of the system takes priority over individual conscience, would try to argue that any system that is defined by argument, could, or should, be defined as unadversarial. Our courts are run as contests with very specific rules. A defense attorney can not turn in his client even if he finds out that he's guilty. If we've decided that a system based on consensus is inappropriate when it comes to law -and I assume the members of the Federalist Society understand why this is so- why are they now arguing for consensus as a means for choosing judges? The court system is based on a notion of imperfect justice. Truth, in any absolute sense, is not part of the process. And if this is so for the decisions that are made inside the courtroom, how can someone argue that somehow the same standard of ambiguity should not apply outside it? Is it the hope of imperfect justice from perfect judges? Forgive me, but the notion of a Platonist legal theory is somewhat oxymoronic, isn't it?"