Thursday, April 03, 2014

"Evidence Based Practice" Dumb and Dumber

The Journal of Strategic Studies
The 1983 Nuclear Crisis – Lessons for Deterrence Theory and Practice
ABSTRACT This article distills insights for the scholarship of deterrence by examining the 1983 nuclear crisis – the moment of maximum danger of the late Cold War. Important contributions notwithstanding, our understanding of this episode still has caveats, and a significant pool of theoretical lessons for strategic studies remain to be learned. Utilizing newly available sources, this article suggests an alternative interpretation of Soviet and US conduct. It argues that the then US deterrence strategy almost produced Soviet nuclear overreaction by nearly turning a NATO exercise into a prelude to a preventive Soviet attack. Building on historical findings, this article offers insights about a mechanism for deterrence effectiveness evaluation, recommends establishing a structure responsible for this endeavor, and introduces a new theoretical term to the strategic studies lexicon – a ‘culminating point of deterrence’.
A new set of rules that eliminate the risk of human error.

The academic terminology, the passive voice, the "new theoretical term", a new label for the filing system, the ethics and aesthetics of bureaucracy.

Where Jerome Groopman meets Evgeny Morozov.

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