Sunday, November 08, 2009

"I cannot remember a more misleading statement than Mr Eric Russell Bentley’s in the Spring Number of the Kenyon Review, 1945: ‘The potentialities of the talking screen differ from those of the silent screen in adding the dimension of dialogue—which could be poetry.’ I would suggest: ‘The potentialities of the talking screen differ from those of the silent screen in integrating visible movement with dialogue which, therefore, had better not be poetry.' "

Erwin Panofsky, Style and Medium in the Motion Pictures
And earlier in the same essay
"Today there is no denying that narrative films are not only 'art'—not often good art, to be sure, but this applies to other media aswell—but also, besides architecture, cartooning and 'commercial design,' the only visual art entirely alive...

In the beginning, then, there were the straight recordings of movement no matter what moved, viz., the prehistoric ancestorsof our 'documentaries'; and, soon after, the early narratives, viz.,the prehistoric ancestors of our 'feature films.' The craving for a narrative element could be satisfied only by borrowing from older arts, and one should expect that the natural thing would have been, to borrow from the theater, a theater play being apparently the genus proximum to a narrative film in that it consists of a narrative enacted by persons that move. But in reality the imitation of stage performances was a comparatively late and thoroughly frustrated development. What happened at the start was a very different thing. Instead of imitating a theatrical performance already endowed with a certain amount of motion, the earliest films added movement to works of art originally stationary, so that the dazzling technical invention might achieve a triumph of its own without in-truding upon the sphere of higher culture. The living language,which is always right, has endorsed this sensible choice when it still speaks of a 'moving picture' or, simply, a 'picture,' instead of accepting the pretentious and fundamentally erroneous 'screenplay.' "
Brilliant, brilliant, man.

Thursday, November 05, 2009

Looking through my archives, I found that I linked to this and quoted the same paragraph, in 2003. Nothing's changed,
But there is something poignant about the Zionist left's continuous attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable. Its criticisms of Sharon hark back to an idealised notion of a Jewish state in which democracy, decency and tolerance are the guiding principles. In moving forwards towards peace with the Palestinians, the left seeks to take a few steps back; consolidating the Jewish state, preserving its Jewish character, withdrawing from the quagmire of occupation and reinstating the values of a democratic and humane society. But to Palestinian ears there is something inherently wrong here: for us, there is a basic and inescapable contradiction between Zionism and democracy. If Zionism means anything, it means a Jewish state with a clear Jewish majority - and in Palestine this has necessarily been at the expense of Palestinian Arab rights.
Wiseman at Film Forum. And more on Levi-Strauss by Maurice Bloch.
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Wednesday, November 04, 2009

Sunday, November 01, 2009

Note-taking
I've written about this enough but it seemed like a good time to do it again.
If I'm running from a lion who's pawed a gash in my leg, my body is communicating information by means of the qualia of "pain," while a robot programmed for its own preservation will receive feedback in concrete quantitative terms. Biomechanical qualia are quanta: vast amounts of data known to us only in totality as sense.

Biological machines are capable of reason but are programmed also by conditioning, and reason and reflex can produce contradictory imperatives. If there's a "choice" to be made, which mechanism is it that "makes" the choice?

Consciousness is not complex calculation it's indecision. Create an indecisive computer, a neurotic computer, torn (having been given the imperative to survive) between the heuristics of conditioned response and calculation, and you'll have a conscious non-biological machine.

Mary the color scientist, seeing -sensing- color for the first time, will learn nothing new about color itself but will now give it a place among the trillions of sense impressions over the course of her life which she has compartmentalized, characterized, and like as not narrativized into her personal logic. She will have a new understanding of color not as independent but in relation to herself as a form of experience within the totality of her imagined and imagining life.
Mary will see, construct, and experience her red.
It will become a part of the totality of her experience and her conditioning.

More:
What exactly are qualitative states? In its definition of qualia at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy begs the question. Perception is physical: experience, sandpaper etc. When animals sense we categorize things in the history of our perceptions (patterning as comfort) Our history is foggy, and facts and values are confused from the start. The machines we make do not have this complex conflicted relation to the world, they’re not desirous or anxious. They have no sense of telos, even a blind drive for survival.

It seems easier to want to ascribe qualitative states to man-made machines than to describe the mechanics of qualitative “experience” and “perception.” To a machine, the blueprint for a building and the building itself are identical, while animals require the presence of the building to understand the thing. And like the color red in doing that we’re not understanding the building or the color but our categorization of it, and all the details that we analogize in relation to what we’ve already stored away. We’re bombarded by perceptions and evocations resulting from perceptions. But all of that can be described in quantitative terms. What’s private -as experience- is that each of us contextualize the data according to our own history. Every animal has his or her own filing system and her own adaptive conditioning. Animals are drunken machines, each of us drunk in our own way.

The limits of conceptualism it seems to me is in the unwillingness to mark the distinction between blueprints and buildings, between ideas and experience, because ideas are universally available and one’s experience of a building is private and therefore secondary, But what this means is that the ability to communicate always private experience atrophies, while experience is still our primary relation to the world. This conversation above seems more about desire than the world we will always only know as experience, while shying away from real questions regarding our biological machinery.

Friday, October 30, 2009

As'ad AbuKhalil
Anna (who appeared with Mustafa Barghuti on the Daily Show) circulated a message about her appearance. I am citing from it (with her permission): "Last night Dr. Barghouti and I were on The Daily Show with Jon Stewart talking about Palestine. The show was overwhelmed with angry emails and phone calls prior to the appearance, and up until the last minute it seemed like they might cancel. During the taping the show had it's only heckler in 11 years.The entire staff were very nervous and may come to regret the monumental decision (and not make it again) as they will surely be inundated now that the show has aired..Many of you who watched the show on TV noticed that everything of real substance that I said was edited out. The major issues cut out were (1) the US role in aiding Israel, (2) the lack of adequate coverage in mainstream US media, and (3) the Palestinian-led movement for Boycott / Divestment / Sanctions (BDS) to nonviolently pressure Israel to comply with international law."
M.J. Rosenberg has been trapped into linking to a friend of AbuKhalil and Ali Abunimah and a supporter of the boycott.
More confusion, logical and moral, from Bernard Avishai. One of the commenters suspects Rosenberg of being an anti-Zionist.
Hemlines go up. Hemlines go down, [see Wednesday]
O God, O Venus, O Mercury, patron of thieves,
Give me in due time, I beseech you, a little tobacco-shop,
With the little bright boxes
piled up neatly upon the shelves
And the loose fragment cavendish
and the shag,
And the bright Virginia
loose under the bright glass cases,
And a pair of scales
not too greasy,
And the whores dropping in for a word or two in passing,
For a flip word, and to tidy their hair a bit.

O God, O Venus, O Mercury, patron of thieves,
Lend me a little tobacco-shop,
or install me in any profession
Save this damn'd profession of writing,
where one needs one's brains all the time.

Thursday, October 29, 2009

Not new but nicely done. Balkin
First, although it's clear that Justice Scalia would not have upheld segregated schools in the states, it's not clear that he would be able to strike down segregated schools in the District of Columbia. In particular, we don't have a good sense of what Justice Scalia thinks of the originalist case for Bolling v. Sharpe, which held that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, ratified in 1791, prohibits racial classifications by the federal government. Consider this: in 1791 black people were held in slavery. It's hard to argue that this clause, interpreted according to the expectations of the late eighteenth century generation that framed it, prevents the federal government from engaging in racial discrimination. Moreover, Justice Scalia has long been an opponent of reading the Due Process Clause to have substantive content. If so, why isn't Bolling v. Sharpe an impermissible form of substantive due process, as impermissible as, say, Roe v. Wade? If Justice Scalia believes that Bolling is correct, it can't be because of his originalist views. Rather, it is, as he would say, a case where courts just made new rights up.

And, of course, if Bolling falls, then so too must the Adarand decision, which held federal affirmative action programs to a standard of strict scrutiny. Indeed, Justice Scalia's view, stated in a concurrence to Adarand itself, is even stronger-- he believes that race conscious federal affirmative action is almost always unconstitutional; as he puts it, "government can never have a "compelling interest" in discriminating on the basis of race in order to "make up" for past racial discrimination in the opposite direction." But if so, what is the basis for that conclusion, given his views on original meaning originalism? It certainly is not consistent with the attitudes or actions of the framers in the Reconstruction Congress that enacted the Fourteenth Amendment. They passed various educational and welfare statutes designed for the benefit of blacks, including free blacks who had not been held in slavery.
I'm reading Erasmus and Luther. Luther as Salafist, searching for truth in dogma. Scalia is more the anti-reformist Churchman, inflexibly defending hypocrisy.

Wednesday, October 28, 2009

John Brown and reaction again. Last reference here

Rothstein's discussion is shallow as always; but it's important to note that we're seeing a right-wing Zionist forced to the position of the liberal Zionist -wringing his hands over terrorism rather than shaking his fist- as liberal Zionists are being forced to the left, to positions once held only by anti-Zionists. This discussion still mostly among and for an audience of Jews, but Palestinians are beginning to make appearances where they would not have been seen even two years ago.

Hemlines creep up, hemlines creep down, the normative changes with changes in experience. Ideas don't lead, they follow.
People are stupid, but there's nothing else to do.

Tuesday, October 27, 2009

In the long run, it will probably be better for the Administration and future Administrations not to say that Fox and its successors are not "legitimate" journalists, but that they are not actually objective journalists; instead they are members of a new party or partisan press. That model of the press may be legitimate in the twenty-first century, but politicians have no obligation to treat it as they treated an earlier model of journalism.
Jack Balkin should know better than to imply that there's such a thing as objective journalism. Still, his response is the best so far.

More Max Roach; younger and working harder. Something a little mannered -affected- creeps into the later performances. But I don't remember that so much seeing him in the years before he died.

Saturday, October 24, 2009


The first time I saw him play this it he'd simplified the central motif down to its basic elements. Played slowly, it was the history of the drum: heartbeat, march, swing; the human, the martial, and the dance. I think I began to cry before I knew the reason.
The great orator of the trap set.

Mop Mop

Purdie Shuffle

Friday, October 23, 2009

Michael Slackman and the NY Times vs the facts.

Tuesday, October 20, 2009

"America was once their country. They sense they are losing it. And they are right."
Pat Buchanan wants for America what Joshua Marshall, M.J. Rosenberg, and every other liberal Zionist wants for Israel.
How to explain the disconnect? I don't know.
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Actually, it's obvious: the reactionary is in relation to the normative, not the objective.
See as always, John Brown.

The leaders of the American revolution were reactionaries in the minds of the British, because to the British revolt was reaction. In fact it was not, but it could have been; that's always the danger. For a revolt to succeed it has to replace one set of normative relations with another. Revolution is never normative and an esthetic of permanent revolution is opposed to the very idea of normative stability. Revolt as reaction becomes self-destruction.

Israel wants to see Palestinian revolt as reaction, and Israeli policy over decades has been designed to that end: support for Hamas against Fatah, the strategic indifference to Yassin, and the expulsion of the pacifist Mubarak Awad. But Hamas is revolt and not reaction, whereas Beck and Buchanan are reaction, simply because they have nothing else to argue from but that.

Zionists, in America at least, could lead normal lives for the same reason Europeans early in the age of Empire could do so: any normative order operates by inclusion and exclusion, and what can be excluded fully can be rendered morally irrelevant. But as outside things move close, becoming neither normative nor fully excluded, when proximity becomes not yet acknowledged intimacy, the mind begins to lose its balance. Sensing the artificiality of moral order and the objective reality of crime, the normative imagination, unwilling to change, twists into perversity. Exclusion and indifference becomes half-conscious rage.

Technocrats are not good diagnosticians.
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addendum: the anxiety of the perverse.



process or product.

Monday, October 19, 2009

It does seem to me that all people of goodwill would welcome the news that it had become possible to proceed otherwise [i.e. in ways that tapped into our nobler, rather than our more selfish, motives] perhaps, for example, because some economists had invented clever ways of harnessing and organizing our capacity for generosity toward others.
Liberal idealists try to institutionalize concern without understanding that institutionalized concern manifests only as pity. There is no care without caring: empathy is a practice not a function. Conservatives understand this and the self-serving hypocrisy of idealist abstraction and their cynical response is institutionalized contempt.

Concern is intimate empiricism: it can be fostered by institutions but can not be institutionalized. I've said this before but the above quote from Cohen, and the discussion around it, are a perfect example of liberal indulgence that will always end in righteous sentimentalism and self-pity. The discussion of hate crimes law and then Freakonomics and my jottings in response brought me back to that quote.

In reference to Levitt and Dubner: the proper response to their contrarian idealism is not game theory or falling back on "conventional wisdom"

Friday, October 16, 2009

And again. [continuing from here]
Naturalized epistemology is mostly a matter of esthetics, analogizing science: a brittle esthetics of names and ideas rather than one constituted of and concerning the ambiguities of naming. So now these idiots are defending their rationalist anti-humanism as humanism and instrumentalism for instrumentalism's sake. Technocracy as valid culture.
Most liberals have no understanding of the rule of law. Liberals are optimists, and the rule of law is founded in pessimism. The argument for the rule of law is fundamentally conservative.
I've always known but its depressing to have to argue it again and again.